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Abstract
This paper assesses the role of ￿nancial frictions and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on an
economy￿ s growth rate, business cycle volatility, and ￿rms￿capital structure. We gauge these
e⁄ects within the Financial Accelerator framework, where entrepreneurs can establish a¢ liates
of local ￿rms abroad through Foreign Direct Investment. Model simulations suggest that in the
presence of credit market imperfections FDI is associated with faster growth, less leverage, and
lower aggregate volatility. These features are consistent with the macroeconomic dynamics of
the more globally integrated economies over the last three decades.
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Over the last three decades the more globally integrated economies have exhibited
faster growth, lower ￿rm leverage, and a moderation in their business cycles. These
trends have been observed in both emerging and developed economies. Our objective
is to assess the extent to which greater ￿nancial integration, in the form of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), can explain them.
For this purpose we work with a uni￿ed theoretical model that predicts the three
observations as ￿rms and countries engage in larger foreign operations. Using an
extension of Bernanke et al. (1999) ￿Financial Accelerator￿ framework, in which
￿rms are able to diversify internationally in the form of FDI, we ￿nd that not only
aggregate volatility declines, but also countries exhibit faster growth and a decrease
in ￿rms￿leverage. These results highlight the e⁄ect of greater international ￿nancial
integration in the presence of credit market frictions.
This work relates to three strands of the literature and tries to identify a common
theoretical thread between them. The ￿rst branch concerns the e⁄ect of greater
openness on growth; the second refers to ￿rms￿￿nancing behavior upon ￿nancial
liberalization; and the third involves the moderation in aggregate volatility around
the world.
While a large part of the debate on the link between openness and growth con-
centrates on whether greater openness is the outcome of better institutions, the con-
sensus is that openness is associated to faster growth. At the ￿rm level, studies have
also shown that multinational corporations tend to grow faster relative to domestic
￿rms, as foreign and domestic capital spending are positively associated generating a
feedback e⁄ect. Furthermore, it has been observed that the expansion of U.S. multi-
nationals have led to a shift towards more capital-intensive production of the parent
￿rm. By working within a theoretical model we are able to show that larger FDI
allows countries and ￿rms to grow faster regardless of the institutional environment.
This ￿nding does not involve technological transfers nor spillovers usually associated
with multinational corporations.1
Another branch of the literature that relates to this work concerns the e⁄ect of in-
ternationalization on ￿rms￿￿nancing choices. Schmukler and Vesperoni (2004) study
how access to international capital markets a⁄ects ￿rms￿capital structure in devel-
oping countries. Based on ￿rm level data from emerging market economies in East
Asia and Latin America they ￿nd that the debt to equity ratios tend to decline after
1For di⁄erent views on openness and growth see Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), Rodrik (2005),
and Dollar and Kraay (2001;2005). In terms of ￿nancial openness, Tornell et al. (2004) show that
￿nancial liberalization leads to larger growth. Razin (2002) and Desai et al. (2005a and 2005b)
document the positive e⁄ect of FDI on domestic growth and capital accumulation. Lipsey (2002)
shows that the expansion of U.S. multinationals have led to more capital-intensive production for
the parent ￿rm.
2￿nancial liberalization. In a related study Claessens and Schmukler (2007) using a
sample of 111 countries generalize the ￿ndings from the developing countries. For
the U.S., San Vicente Portes and Ozenbas (2007), document a secular decline in ￿rm
leverage over the last three decades as well. In addition, several studies have con-
sistently shown that multinational corporations tend to have lower debt ratios than
purely domestic ￿rms.2
The third strand of the literature to which this paper relates is the moderation
in business cycle volatility in both developed and developing countries. Kim and
Nelson (1999), and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) were the ￿rst to identify the
moderation in output volatility in the U.S. Then Blanchard and Simone (2001) and
Stock and Watson (2003) showed a similar decline in output volatility in other G-7
countries.3 In recent work the IMF (2005) and Haskura (2007) document even larger
drops in volatility in emerging markets and developing economies.
Closer to this paper is the work by San Vicente Portes (2007), who documents
the expansion of U.S. multinationals since the mid 1980s, and explores their role in
the U.S. moderation. He shows that the diversifying nature of multinational corpo-
rations could lead to a signi￿cant reduction in output and investment volatility in a
calibrated model of the U.S. economy. Based on those ￿ndings we investigate whether
such mechanism may also be at work in other countries, and if so what would the
predictions on growth and capital structure be.
The starting point of the analysis consists on establishing whether FDI-moderation
link holds in a sample of developing and developed countries. Then, we build a model
that replicates this observation and endogenously generates other testable predictions
on growth and ￿nancing patterns.
The initial observation is the negative relation between FDI and output volatility.
Controlling for (log) real per capita income, in￿ ation, and openness to trade (ratio
of imports plus exports to GDP), Figure 1 plots the ratio of FDI to GDP against
the 10-year rolling window standard deviation of GDP growth based on a sample 178
countries.
2See Burgman (1996), Chen et al. (1997), and Khambata and Reeb (2000).
3Stock and Watson (2002, 2003) and Blanchard and Simone (2001) further showed that the
phenomenon is not unique to aggregate output but it is also present in most U.S. macroeconomic
time series. Additional references on the moderation of output volatility include Ahmed, Levin and
Wilson (2004), and Faust and Doyle (2004).
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Figure 1. Foreign Direct Investment and Output Volatility
Notes: This ￿gure plots the ratio of FDI to GDP against the 10-year rolling window
standard deviation of GDP growth controlled for per capita income, in￿ ation, and open-
ness to trade. The full sample consists of 1403 observations from 178 coutries for the
period between 1960-2000. Without high-income countries the subsample consists of 809
observations. The slope coe¢ cient of each regression line is signi￿cant at a 5 percent level.
This ￿gure suggest a negative relationship between FDI and output volatility for
both developed and developing countries. For the whole sample (thicker marker)
and for the subsample that excludes high income countries (thinner marker), the
slope estimates are statistically signi￿cant at a 5 percent level.4 The mechanism
underlying this relationship can be attributed to a standard diversi￿cation argument.
To the extent that the operations of a ￿rm￿ s domestic and foreign a¢ liates are not
perfectly positively correlated, the multinational corporations will exhibit smoother
patterns of investment, production, sales, pro￿ts and earnings.5
A major feature of Figure 1 is that once we control for country size and interna-
tional exposure, both developed and developing countries exhibit the same moderation
e⁄ect from international diversi￿cation. Figure 2 displays individual country scatters
for the U.S., New Zealand, Chile, and Morocco. In this diverse set of countries we
￿nd the same pattern.
4We use the 2006 World Bank classi￿cation to group countries into high-income and the rest.
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Figure 2. Selected Countries: FDI and Output Volatility
Notes: This ￿gure plots the ratio of FDI to GDP against the 10-year rolling window
standard deviation of GDP growth for selected countries. The slope estimates are at least
signi￿cant at a 10 percent level.
Hence, as countries have integrated to the rest of the world through FDI, inter-
national diversi￿cation seem to have provided them with a mechanism that reduces
the volatility of their business cycles. As to whether FDI promotes faster growth, the
literature does point out towards that direction. And can FDI be part of the chang-
ing ￿nancial structure of ￿rms remains an open question. Next we layout a general
equilibrium model with credit market frictions that allows for FDI, which connects
and yields new insights into these matters.
The contribution of this paper is to provide the theoretical linkages among the
trends identi￿ed in the literature. With this in mind, we use a theoretical model
that allows us to qualitatively explore the channels through which FDI could af-
fect the home economy, and quantitatively determine their importance. Following
San Vicente Portes (2007) we work with an extension of the ￿Financial Accelerator￿
framework that allows entrepreneurs to diversify internationally through FDI. In that
work it is shown that in the presence of credit market imperfections international di-
versi￿cation is associated with lower output volatility, as smoother dynamics of net
worth, translate into less volatile terms of credit, investment and production. How-
ever, the rami￿cations of FDI on aggregate growth rates and ￿rms￿capital structure
5are left unexplored. This paper seeks to simultaneously analyze the e⁄ects of FDI
on growth, capital structure and volatility within a uni￿ed framework, and test the
model￿ s predictions against the observed trends.
Our main ￿nding is that in spite of international diversi￿cation being a mitigating
force on credit cycles, larger ￿rm operations could result in larger borrowing costs,
which steer ￿rms away from debt towards internal ￿nancing. Larger internal ￿nanc-
ing increases the economy￿ s rate of capital accumulation and therefore of growth.
Higher net worth, in addition to the diversifying bene￿ts of FDI, dampens the credit
market friction leading to smoother credit cycles, and thus smoother investment and
production.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 describes
the calibration of the model and the solution method, Section 4 reports the model￿ s
results, Section 5 presents the model￿ s sensitivity to changes in the diversi￿cation
parameters, and Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
To explore the linkages between FDI, growth, aggregate volatility, and ￿rms￿￿nancing
decisions, we work with a model that introduces FDI to Bernanke et al. (1999) ￿Fi-
nancial Accelerator￿framework. The ￿Financial Accelerator￿framework is a general
equilibrium model in which the ￿rms￿ability to borrow to ￿nance their investment
depends on the ￿rms￿net worth. Speci￿cally, the lower the net worth the higher
the interest rate at which a ￿rm borrows. This mechanism ampli￿es the propagation
of shocks through the economy and underlies the economy￿ s ability to grow. For
instance, in bad times ￿rms are not only hit by lower productivity but also tighter
credit conditions that decrease investment and output further. After a positive pro-
ductivity shock, high net worth leads to better terms of credit that boost investment
and expand the business cycle.6
The choice of this theoretical framework stems from its rich structure and suit-
ability for our research questions. In particular, it is an stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium growth model that endogenously generates business cycle statistics that
can be compared to the data, and it embeds a realistic debt contract that in turn
determines a ￿rm￿ s capital structure. Furthermore, the model accounts for the inter-
action of aggregate and ￿rm-speci￿c (idiosyncratic) shocks. The latter feature is of
special importance as our interest lies in assessing the e⁄ect of ￿rm-speci￿c shocks at
home and abroad on aggregate dynamics and ￿rm ￿nancing.
Following San Vicente Portes (2007) we add FDI as part of the entrepreneurs￿
6See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for a propagation mechanism based on collateral constraints
rather than moral hazard.
6business plan.7 That is, a local ￿rm can have foreign a¢ liates and essentially become
a multinational corporation. To solely focus on the e⁄ect of FDI out￿ ows on the home
economy we rule out that foreign aggregate productivity shocks pass through to the
parent ￿rm; though aggregate technology shocks at home pass through to foreign
a¢ liates.8 By doing this, any macroeconomic change can only be attributed to the
￿rms￿foreign investment. This modelling approach also controls for the transmission
of international business cycles on the home economy or changes in business cycle
correlations across countries, which could potentially also lead to a moderation in
business cycles.9
The model consists of households who hold deposits with a ￿nancial intermedi-
ary that lends to domestic ￿rms (DCs) and home based multinational corporations
MNCs to ￿nance the purchases of their desired capital stock from capital producers.
Entrepreneurs own the ￿rms (DC or MNC) and hire labor from households in order to
produce the consumption good. However, the ￿nancial intermediary cannot observe
the ￿rms￿returns on their assets unless the intermediary pays a veri￿cation cost. The
solution to this credit market imperfection consists of a standard debt contract, which
generates the ￿Financial Accelerator￿ .
The model consists of two building blocks. One involves the design of the optimal
contract due to the Costly State Veri￿cation, and the second comprises real business
cycle (RBC) features of the model such as household behavior, the evolution of the
capital stock, and the technology available to ￿rms.
To focus on the e⁄ect of larger international diversi￿cation on macroeconomic
dynamics, the paper abstracts from some of the features associated to FDI such as
knowledge and technology transfers, and vertical integration; and there is only one
type of multinational: home￿ based.10 In the model there is only one consumption
good, which is produced at home by DCs and the parents of MNCs, and abroad by
the MNCs￿a¢ liates.11
7To keep the focus of the investigation on the real side of the economy, we abstract from the
monetary side of Bernanke et al. (1999); whose motivation included the study of nominal rigidities.
8Desai and Foley (2004) ￿nd a high correlation between parents￿and a¢ liates￿return and in-
vestment rates; this being consistent with the transmission of productivity shocks within the MNC.
Furthermore, they establish that the direction of causality goes from parents to foreign a¢ liates.
9Heathcote and Perri (2004) document a signi￿cant decline in output, investment and employment
correlations between the U.S. and the rest of the industrialized world after 1987. Other references
about the decline in international business cycle correlations include Stock and Watson (2003) and
Faust and Doyle (2004).
10By only modelling home-based multinationals, the e⁄ect of larger foreign investment is simulta-
neously captured in the model￿ s GDP (by means of the multinationals￿parents) and GNP (through
the multinationals￿parents and a¢ liates).
11The decision to be a domestic or a multinational company, and the determinants of the size of
foreign a¢ liates are beyond the scope of the study. For the calibration of the model these features
are taken as given from the data.
72.1 The ￿Financial Accelerator￿
The ￿Financial Accelerator￿arises due to the inability of the ￿nancial intermediary
(the principal) to costlessly observe the ￿rm￿ s (the agent) idiosyncratic return on
its assets. This induces borrowers to understate the return on their assets. Follow-
ing Townsend (1979) and Bernanke et al. (1999) we design a truth-telling optimal
contract so that the ￿rm and the ￿nancial intermediary agree on a non-default in-
terest rate and a cuto⁄ return, for which realizations below it trigger the lender￿ s
veri￿cation.
San Vicente Portes (2007) extends Bernanke et al. (1999) framework by intro-
ducing FDI. By doing so ￿rms are exposed to shocks at home and abroad. In such
framework an internationally diversi￿ed ￿rm consists of a parent ￿rm and a majority
owned foreign a¢ liate (MOFA). The ￿nancial structure of a multinational corpora-
tion in a given period is made up by its assets (QK +QK￿), liabilities (B + B￿);and
its net worth (N + N￿); where the MOFA￿ s variables are denoted by an ￿ ￿￿and Q
denotes the price of capital in terms of the consumption good. What distinguishes
a MNC from a DC is that DCs do not have a¢ liates, so that for a DC all ￿ starred￿
variables are zero.12
In the model there is a continuum of ￿rms indexed by j 2 [0;1]: Every period each
￿rm￿ s assets are subject to an idiosyncratic shock to the return on their assets !j
at home and !￿
jabroad. The return on an internationally diversi￿ed ￿rm￿ s assets is
given by: !jRkQKj + !￿
jRkQK￿
j: Where Rk denotes the economy-wide gross return
on capital, and !j and !￿
j are assumed to be two jointly distributed random variables
with mean ￿! = ￿!￿ = 1; variance ￿2
! = ￿2
!￿; and correlation ￿!;!￿.
In the model the degree of international diversi￿cation is given by their FDI. For
this purpose let ￿j denote the parent￿ s share of MNC￿ s assets. The smaller the
parent￿ s share of the multinational￿ s assets (￿j); the larger the importance of its
a¢ liates (FDI). Since DCs do not hold any assets abroad, by de￿nition ￿j is equal to
one for a domestic company. When the parent and the a¢ liate hold an equal share
of the MNC￿ s assets, ￿j equals one half.13
This way, let Kj = ￿jKMNC;j and K￿
j = (1￿￿j)KMNC;j represent the parent￿ s and
the a¢ liate￿ s capital stock holdings within the jth multinational, respectively. Thus






Kj; and the multinational￿ s











12Since all variables are contemporaneous, for expositional simplicity time subscripts are omitted
in this subsection.
13The study of determinants of the parent￿ s share of the multinational￿ s assets (￿j) is beyond the
scope of the paper. However, ￿ bridges the models with and without multinationals. By setting
￿j = 1 for every j; the model collapses to Bernanke et al. (1999). See section 3 for a the description
of the calibration of ￿ used for the model simulations.
8In terms of the ￿rms￿capital structure, entrepreneurs ￿nance their desired capital
stock with their own funds (net worth) and by borrowing from the ￿nancial intermedi-











. However, because of Costly State Veri￿cation, the Modigliani-
Miller theorem does not hold and there is a wedge in the cost of external and internal
￿nancing.14 The ￿rm-speci￿c cost of external ￿nancing is greater than the opportunity
cost of internal funds, where the latter is given by the economy￿ wide risk￿ free rate.












As before, for DCs ￿j is equal to one implying that B￿
j is equal to zero. Because
international ￿nancial markets are not explicitly modeled, MNCs are assumed to
borrow from the home country the di⁄erence between their net worth and their desired
capital stock for domestic and foreign operations.16
2.1.1 International Diversi￿cation
When home and foreign ￿rm-speci￿c shocks are not perfectly positively correlated a
good realization of a shock in one location may o⁄set a poor realization from another
location; leading to more stable net worth, to a lower probability of default and to
smoother terms of credit. Given the parent￿ s capital stock (Kj), debt (Bj), borrowing
interest rate (Zj), the economy-wide price of capital (Q) and return on capital (Rk), a
￿rm￿ s performance is determined by the realizations of its idiosyncratic shocks. This
gives rise to the following cases.17
























14Bernanke and Gertler (1989) present evidence from the U.S. manufacturing industry, where
informational asymmetries in credit markets raise the ￿rms￿cost of external ￿nancing relative to
internal funds. More recently, Levin et al. (2004), based on a sample of publicly traded ￿rms for
the period between 1997 and 2003, consistently reject the hypothesis of frictionless ￿nancial markets
in di⁄erent tests, as they document a signi￿cant increase in the external ￿nance premium for these
￿rms during the 2001 recession.
15For the U.S. it has been observed that the parents￿share of the MNCs￿assets has coincided with
their share of debt, net worth, employment and capital expenditure during the 1984-2000 period
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2002). This way, ￿j is also used to represent the parent￿ s share of
the MNC￿ s debt.
16In practice, foreign a¢ liates borrow from local and international sources. Nonetheless, Desai,
Foley and Hines (2004) document that parents are an important source of funding for foreign af-
￿liates. Furthermore, Altshuler and Grubert (1996) report evidence that U.S. multinationals use
assets held abroad to support loans at home.
17The performance of a DC is also characterized by these cases, provided that ￿j is equal to 1.
























Case 1 is the basis of the debt contract between the ￿rm and the ￿nancial interme-
diary. The contract is characterized by the amount borrowed, the borrowing interest
rate, and the set of cuto⁄ values for ! and !￿ for which there is veri￿cation. Let
lj ￿
ZjBj
RkQKj; be a measure of the ￿rm￿ s leverage. This way, case 1 can be expressed
as:
￿




The hedge against domestic risk depends on the importance of a ￿rm￿ s foreign












Figure 3. Firm￿ s Performance: Shocks to Domestic and Foreign Operations
Notes: This ￿gure shows the combinations of idiosyncratic shocks at home and
abroad for which a ￿rm survives, breaks even, and defaults on its debt, for dif-
ferent levels of international diversi￿cation. The larger ￿ the less internationally
diversi￿ed the ￿rm is.
For a given value of lj and ￿j, the straight lines represent the combinations of
(!j;!￿
j) for which an internationally diversi￿ed ￿rm breaks even (case 1). Realizations
under the line lead to bankruptcy and to the lender￿ s veri￿cation (case 3), while with
realizations above the line the ￿rm accumulates net worth (case 2). In contrast, a
non-diversi￿ed ￿rm does not have the safeguard against a poor realization at home.
By comparing the frontiers associated with ￿1 and ￿2; one can observe that the
less diversi￿ed the MNC is (larger ￿j), low realizations of ! (close to zero) require
increasingly large realizations of !￿ for the ￿rm to survive. That is, the MNC must
10get a high realization abroad to make up for the poor performance at home.18 This
way, ￿j < 1; implies lower risk, better terms of credit, and more stable net worth,
investment, and output relative to a non-internationally diversi￿ed ￿rm.19














In summary, when a DC and a MNC have the same capital stock, unless home
and foreign idiosyncratic shocks are perfectly positively correlated, the volatility of
the return on the multinational￿ s capital will always be less than that of a domestic
corporation.
2.1.2 The Financial Contract
The debt contract is realized within each period. The timing is as follows. The
￿rm enters the period with a given net worth. Then, observes the realization of the
aggregate technology shock, hires labor and decides how much to borrow in order to
￿nance the di⁄erence between its net worth and its desired capital stock; then the
￿rm￿ s idiosyncratic shock(s) are realized and pays back its debt, labor costs, sells its
capital, and keeps any remaining funds as net worth with which it goes into the next
period.
Firms borrow from a Financial Intermediary. The ￿nancial intermediary is as-
sumed to be a competitive entity that funds itself from households￿deposits, on
which it pays the risk-free gross interest rate R: Zero-pro￿ts in ￿nancial interme-
































The ￿rst term of this equation represents the ￿nancial intermediary￿ s expected
recovery value in the event of default, after accounting for the veri￿cation cost. The
second term accounts for the expected non-default payback of the loan by the ￿rm.
The right side of the equation represents the ￿nancial intermediary￿ s funding costs;
18Though, when the MNC is less diversi￿ed (high ￿j) poor realizations abroad require smaller
realization at home to survive.
19See San Vicente Portes (2007) for a formal proof of this argument.
20The notation convention adopted in the paper is that !j and !￿
j represent the ￿rm speci￿c real-
izations of the random variables ! and !￿: When either ! or !￿ are part of the limits of integration,
integrals are de￿ned over s and s￿; which stand for ! and !￿; respectively.
11that is, the gross risk-free interest rate on the amount borrowed. Using the ￿rm￿ s



























The borrowing side of the contract corresponds to the ￿rm. Entrepreneurs are
assumed to be risk neutral, and borrow from the ￿nancial intermediary the di⁄erence
between their desired capital stock and their net worth. Their objective is to maximize
the di⁄erence between the expected return on their assets and the expected ￿nancing










































Given that the mean of the two idiosyncratic shocks is equal to one, this expression







kQKj ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(lj)]
1
￿j
Zj(QKj ￿ Nj): (2)
Where the ￿rst term is the expected non-default return on the ￿rm￿ s assets and
the second term represents the non-default ￿nancing costs.
This way, given the entrepreneur￿ s net worth, the price of capital and the economy-
wide return on capital, the pro￿t-maximizing contract between the ￿rm and the
￿nancial intermediary is such that the choice for the capital stock (Kj) maximizes













s.t. [1 ￿ ￿(lj)]
1
￿j





21This formulation is equivalent to the ￿rm maximizing its expected net worth. Refer to section
2.2.4.
22Details presented in Appendix A.
12The optimal contract implies a unique cuto⁄ value for lj that determines the
combinations of ! and !￿ for which there is veri￿cation (refer to case 1).23 The
solution to this problem is part of the model￿ s general equilibrium.
2.1.3 The Financial Accelerator and Aggregation
The ￿Financial Accelerator￿arises from equation 1. It implies that the borrowing
interest rate is decreasing in net worth and the ￿rms￿demand for capital is increasing
in net worth. The inverse relation between net worth and interest rates generates the
ampli￿cation mechanism since the ￿rms￿investment and output depend on the terms
of borrowing, which are in turn determined by the dynamics of net worth.24 To see











This expression shows that in equilibrium the borrowing interest rate is decreasing
in net worth Nj; and increasing in the probability of default, ￿(lj).
In the model the demand for capital is linear in net worth. This in turn allows
for the aggregation of ￿rms in the model into a representative one. Di⁄erent levels
of net worth across ￿rms requires keeping track of each ￿rm when solving the model.
However, as noted by Bernanke et al. (1999) the problem of accounting for ￿rm
heterogeneity need not arise since ￿rms are scaled versions of each other. Constant
returns to scale in production, together with the demand for capital being linear in
net worth, su¢ ce to determine the aggregate demand for capital given the total stock
of net worth.25 In particular, equation 1 can be written as:
QKj =
￿
R ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(lj)]
R ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(lj)]Zj ￿ ￿j(1 ￿ ￿)￿(lj)Rk
￿
Nj:
This equation shows that the ￿rms￿demand for capital is increasing in net worth
(Nj) and in the economy￿ s return on capital (Rk); and decreasing in the risk free
interest rate (R). However, to aggregate across ￿rms, the term in brackets should
be a the same for every ￿rm. When this term is a constant that only depends on
economy￿ wide variables, one can integrate over the continuum of ￿rms to determine
the aggregate demand for capital.
However, the model with MNCs adds a dimension in which ￿rms can di⁄er: the
size of their FDI. In addition to di⁄erent net worth, MNCs can also vary in the
parent￿ s share of the multinational￿ s assets (￿). San Vicente Portes (2007) shows
23For a non-diversi￿ed company, lj represents the upper bound of a range of realizations of ! for
which there is veri￿cation (see Bernanke et al., 1999). The equilibrium allocation that solves the
debt contract is Pareto e¢ cient (see Townsend, 1979).
24The derivations of the results presented in this subsection are collected in Appendix B.
25 Constant returns to scale imply that in equilibrium the capital-labor ratio is constant across
￿rms.





, thus allowing for aggregation. This way, the
aggregate demand for capital is given by:
QK =
￿
R ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(l)]
R ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(l)]Z ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿(l)Rk
￿
N:
2.2 The RBC Model
The optimal contract between ￿rms and ￿nancial intermediaries is embedded into
a standard real business cycle model. This side of the model involves the house-
holds￿problem, the suppliers of physical capital, the production technology, and the
dynamics of the capital stock.
2.2.1 Households
In the model there is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households of measure one, whose
preferences are de￿ned over consumption and leisure. Households maximize their
discounted lifetime utility and hold deposits with the ￿nancial intermediary, who
pays a riskless rate of return. Household utility is separable over time, consumption,
and leisure. The ith household problem is:






s.t. Ct;i + Dt+1;i = WtHt;i + RtDt;i:
Where Ct;i;Ht;i and Dt+1;i are period t decisions over consumption, labor, and
period t+1 available deposits with the ￿nancial intermediary, who pays gross return
Rt. The intertemporal discount factor is given by ￿ 2 (0;1):
Since the households￿choices are determined by economy-wide variables (Wt and
Rt), individual values of consumption and labor correspond to their aggregate coun-
terparts.
2.2.2 Capital Producers
In the model, entrepreneurs buy their desired capital stock from capital producers.
Capital producers are competitive entities that transform investment expenditures
(It) and the undepreciated capital stock into new capital. All capital is homogeneous
so new capital is indistinguishable from used capital. Qt is the relative price of capital,
and represents the amount of the consumption good that must be exchanged for a










Kt + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt
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￿ It ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)QtKt:
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represents the production function for capital. This production function
is assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal productivity (￿0(￿) > 0 and ￿00(￿) < 0);
implying that large changes in the capital stock are increasingly costly, re￿ ecting
adjustment costs in the capital stock. The second and third terms represent the cost
of producing the new capital.
The solution to the capital producers￿problem determines the economy-wide price






Kt + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt:
2.2.3 Production
The production technology for the consumption good requires capital and labor, and
these inputs are subject to aggregate productivity shocks. In addition, entrepreneurs
are assumed to supply their labor inelastically.27 In each period t the aggregate






Where Lt = H￿
t (He
t)1￿￿; is a composite of household labor, Ht, and entrepreneurial
labor, He
t; and At represents the aggregate technology shock. In the model, the
wage rate for households is denoted by Wt and by W e
t for entrepreneurs. Following
Bernanke et al. (1999), He
t is normalized to one.
The technology shocks are characterized by the following autoregressive process:
At ￿ e







The mean gross return on a unit of capital (in units of capital), Rk










+ (1 ￿ ￿):





; for every t: This
expression determines the economy￿ wide price of capital.
27Entrepreneurial labor is introduced to avoid ￿rms eventually having zero net worth and to keep
the optimal contract well de￿ned. Note from section 2.1.3 that zero net worth implies that the
demand for capital is zero (see Bernanke et al., 1999).
28Since E[!] = E[!￿] = 1 the mean return on capital across ￿rms is Rk
t:
15The ￿rst term on the right side of the equation corresponds to the marginal prod-
uct of capital in units of capital, and the second term represents the undepreciated
portion.
2.2.4 Evolution of Net Worth
Like in Bernanke et al. (1999), in addition to bankruptcy, ￿rms might exit exoge-
nously on a given period with probability (1 ￿ ￿). Firm turnover along with the
equilibrium bankruptcy rate determine the evolution of aggregate net worth. The
law of motion of net worth is given by the economy￿ s non￿ default expected asset
return net of the ￿nancial intermediaries funding costs (weighted by the probability

















￿Dying￿￿rms are assumed to consume their net worth giving rise to entrepreneur-
ial consumption (Ce























decision rules for fCt;Ht;Itg1
t=0; and laws of motion for fKt+1;Nt+1;Dt+1;At+1g1
t=0;
such that every period:
1. The households￿problem is solved.
2. Firms￿maximize the expected return on their assets (the agency problem is
solved).
3. Capital producers maximize pro￿ts.
4. The labor market clears:30












29The term in brackets is obtained from value function associated to the optimal contract￿
substituting equation 1 into equation 2.
30The ￿rm￿ s demand for labor represents the pro￿t maximizing condition that the marginal product
of labor should be equal to the real wage. These conditions arise when Rk




t )1￿￿]1￿￿ ￿ wtHt ￿ we
tHe
t + (1 ￿ ￿)QtKt; in the ￿rm￿ s problem and He is normalized
to one: See appendix A.










6. The goods market clears:
1
￿
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + It + ￿￿(lt)R
k
tQtKt:
The last equilibrium condition states that the goods market clears when national
income is allocated between household consumption, entrepreneurial consumption,
investment, and audit costs spent on bankrupt ￿rms. The model is closed by including
the a¢ liates￿production in this equilibrium condition since the ￿rest of the world￿is
not explicitly modeled. That is, revenue from foreign operations is repatriated.
3 Solution Method and Calibration
We solve the model by linearizing around the steady state, and then applying the
Schur decomposition to compute the decision rules of non-predetermined variables
and the laws of motion of pre-determined variables.
The numerical solution involves the following functional forms:
Utility function : u(Ct;Ht) = log(Ct) +   log(1 ￿ Ht):










Productivity shock : At ￿ e








Idiosyncratic shocks : !t ￿ e
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The de￿nition of !t and !￿
t imply that their distribution is lognormal with E(!t) =
E(!￿
t) ’ 1; and var(!t) = var(!￿
t) ’ ￿2
x:
Given that both developed and developing countries exhibit the same trends in
output volatility and capital structure we calibrate the model to match certain fea-
tures of the U.S. economy. This is particularly helpful for a data based calibration of
17the international related parameters; namely, the share of the parent￿ s assets and cor-
relation between idiosyncratic shocks. For the calibration exercise each model period
represents one quarter of a year. In Table 1, we present the parameter values used for
solving the model. The structural parameters, commonly used in the business cycle
literature, were borrowed from Bernanke et al. (1999) and Cooley (1995).
Table 1. Model Parametrization
Preferences Discount factor ￿ = 0:99
Labor weight   = 2
Technology Capital share ￿ = 0:36
Persistence of prod. innovations ￿ = 0:95
Std. Dev. of prod. innovations ￿" = 0:01
Depreciation rate ￿ = 0:02
Capital adjustment ￿ = 0:86
Fin. Accelerator Veri￿cation cost ￿ = 0:12
Firm￿ s probability of surviving ￿ = 0:97
Std. Dev of idiosyncratic shocks ￿! = 0:07
Entrepreneur￿ s share 1 ￿ ￿ = 0:01
Int￿ l Diversi￿cation Share of capital at home ￿ = 0:95
Correlation of idiosyncratic shocks ￿!;!￿ = 0:2
Notes: This table reports the parameter values used to solve the model.
The variance of ! was calibrated to match the model￿ s output volatility with that
observed for the U.S. between 1960 and 1983, since 1984 is often cited as the year
in which the break in U.S. volatility took place.31 This in turn allows for a direct
assessment of the role of FDI in the moderation in output volatility.
The parameter values associated with international diversi￿cation are taken from
San Vicente Portes (2007). In particular, ￿ is calibrated such that it represents the
share of the home-based U.S capital stock relative to the total U.S. capital stock
(home ￿xed assets and direct investment position abroad). For aggregation to hold
all ￿rms in the economy are treated as ￿small￿multinationals with an equal share of
capital abroad. The correlation between domestic and foreign idiosyncratic shocks is
constructed from a model equivalent series of RkQK for U.S. parents and a¢ liates
for the agriculture, mining, utilities, primary metals, fabricated metals, wholesale
trade, retail trade, transportation and accommodation industries, with data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis Annual Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad for
the period 1994 to 2003. For each industry the correlation between the deviations
from trend of the parents and a¢ liates HP-￿ltered series was calculated and ￿!;!￿ is
the average correlation across industries.
31See Kim and Nelson (1999), and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
184 Results
Referring back to the motivation of the study, we wish to establish the role of greater
economic integration in the form of outward FDI on ￿rms￿capital structure, and on
countries￿growth rates and aggregate volatility. We begin the analysis by comparing
the deterministic transitional dynamics to the steady state of an economy with no
FDI to one internationally diversi￿ed. Then, we run a series of simulations of the
two types of economies and calculate their corresponding output, investment, and net
worth volatilities; and contrast the implied capital structure to trace the mechanisms
at work.
We begin the analysis of the quantitative predictions of the model by exploring
the growth implication of FDI. We do this by calculating the speed of convergence to
the steady state. For a given initial level of capital we test the elapsed time for the
economy to reach the long run capital stock and thus GDP.
In particular, we study an economy without FDI and one internationally diver-
si￿ed, and start them at half the steady state level of capital. Then, we track the
transition to the steady state in the absence of any shocks. Figure 4 plots the level
of capital relative to the steady state for the two economies. From it we observe that
the economy that allows for FDI converges much more rapidly to the steady state
that one with out it.













Convergence to Steady State Capital Stock
No FDI
FDI
Figure 4. Transitional Dynamics
Notes: This ￿gure shows the path of capital relative to the steady state
for an economy with FDI and one without international diversi￿cation
in the absence of shocks.
19From the comparison above we ￿nd support for the positive e⁄ects of openness on
growth. All else equal, the model suggests that countries more ￿nancially integrated
in the form of FDI would tend to grow faster. The reason for this is the e⁄ect
of diversi￿cation on the ￿rms￿￿nancing decisions in combination the credit market
frictions. We discuss these e⁄ects below as we integrate our ￿ndings.
Next we explore stochastic implications of greater FDI and whether it can provide
some insights into the moderation of business cycles around the world. To this e⁄ect
we calculate the volatility of output, investment and net worth associated with di⁄er-
ent levels of FDI. Again we work with an economy without FDI and another in which
￿rms run operations at home and abroad. The simulation assumes the economies
start of at their steady state.
For the analysis we simulate 100 model periods 10,000 times for the two economies.
Then, we compute the variance of the deviations from trend of the HP-￿ltered series
for output, investment and net worth for each 100 period simulation. Then we calcu-
late the average volatility of the 10,000 simulations. In Table 2 we report the average
percentage standard deviation of output, investment, and net worth for both models.
These results suggest that larger international diversi￿cation is associated to lower
aggregate volatility.
Table 2. Volatility and Capital Structure
No FDI FDI
Volatility
% Std. Dev. Output 1.77 1.41
% Std. Dev. Investment 5.32 3.56
% Std. Dev. Net Worth 3.48 1.66
Capital Structure
Net Worth / Assets 0.22 0.30
Notes: This table reports the volatility of output, investment and net
worth, and the steady state capital structure for a model without FDI
and a model with FDI. The volatility measures represent the average
percentage standard deviation from 10,000 simulations of a 100-period
economy.
Table 2 also presents the steady state capital structure for both models. The results
indicate an increase in the ratio of net worth to assets as ￿rms expand internationally.
This implies a decrease in leverage, as ￿rms shift their capital structure away from
debt toward equity.
Based on the Federal Reserve￿ s (2006) Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States, the ratio of corporate debt to ￿nancial assets in the U.S. was around 0:65 in
1984, the year corresponding to the benchmark calibration. By the year 2004, this
20ratio had fallen to approximately 0:5. Based on Table 2, the model accounts for more
than half the decrease, as it predicts an 800 basis points reduction in leverage due to
FDI.32
To understand the shift in capital structure we turn to the ￿nancial contract. As
noted before, the borrowing interest rate is decreasing in the probability of default,
and increasing in the size of the loan relative to net worth. Hence, all else equal there
are two opposite e⁄ects on the external ￿nance premium associated to FDI. On one
hand, it reduces the interest rate on loans due to diversi￿cation; but on the other,
more borrowing (to ￿nance larger ￿rms) raises the external ￿nance premium. To
counteract the latter, entrepreneurs raise internal ￿nancing relative to debt.
Since the optimal capital structure is determined in general equilibrium, simulta-
neously with all the other variables of the model, all we observe are two reinforcing
e⁄ects that dampen the ￿Financial Accelerator￿ : less debt and greater international
diversi￿cation. This way, the decrease in leverage along with the diversifying e⁄ect
from foreign operations lead to smoother credit cycles, and thus to less volatile in-
vestment and production. Furthermore, larger internal ￿nancing boosts aggregate
capital accumulation and the rate of economic growth (see Figure 4).
We end this section by showing the response of the two economies to a common
100-period sequence of shocks. In Panel A of Figure 5 we show that when subject to
the same shocks, the economy with FDI presents a lower fall in output after a neg-
ative productivity shock as ￿rms are internationally diversi￿ed and exhibit stronger
balance sheets. In upturns, the relatively higher net worth curbs the ￿rms￿demand
for external ￿nancing and thus the response in output and investment. In contrast, in
the economy with no FDI upon a positive productivity shock ￿rms take full advantage
of the better terms of credit to increase production.
In Panel B we show the di⁄erence in the response of each of the two economies to
the same aggregate shock. For this purpose we subtract the deviation from trend in
the economy with FDI from the economy without. For both, positive and negative
shocks, the non-diversi￿ed economy responds more as it exhibits a stronger ￿nan-
cial accelerator. Moreover, the mirror pattern between the panels suggests that the
di⁄erence in the propagation of shocks between these economies is proportional to
the magnitude of the shocks: the larger the shock, the larger the di⁄erence in the
deviation from trend between the economies.
32The corresponding ￿gures implied by the model are 0:78 under the benchmark calibration and
0:7 in the model with FDI (see Table 3).









Panel A. Output deviations from trend
No FDI
FDI








Panel B. Difference in deviations from trend (No FDI - FDI)
Figure 5. Output Simulation
Notes: Panel A shows the path of output of the economy without FDI and that from the
economy with FDI when subject to the same sequence of shocks. Panel B shows the di⁄erence
in the response of each of the economies to the same aggregate shock. The di⁄erence is
calculated by subtracting the deviation from trend in the economy with FDI from that of the
non-diversi￿ed economy.
The quantitative analysis of our model rationalizes three trends observed in the
more globally integrated economies around the world: 1) faster growth, 2) lower
volatility of the business cycles, and 3) a decrease in ￿rms￿leverage. International
diversi￿cation through FDI allows ￿rms (and countries) to hedge against domestic
risk leading to more stable net worth, investment and output. Though in the presence
of credit market frictions, ￿rms trade o⁄ the bene￿ts of diversi￿cation against higher
external ￿nance premia due to higher capital needs. In equilibrium, to counteract
higher ￿nancial costs ￿rms lower their debt in favor of higher net worth. Thus, larger
capital accumulation leads to faster output growth.
5 Sensitivity
Having observed that larger FDI is associated to lower output volatility, faster growth
and lower leverage, in this section we report the model￿ s sensitivity to changes in the
parameters that underlie the diversi￿cation mechanism. Namely, the share of capital
at home (￿) and the correlation between idiosyncratic shocks. In Table 3 we present
the volatility of output associated to changes in these parameters. The middle column
reproduces the results from the benchmark calibration.
22Table 3. Diversi￿cation and Aggregate Volatility
(% Std. Dev. Output)
Share of capital at home (￿) 0.975 0.95 0.925
1.49 1.41 1.24
Correlation of idiosyncratic shocks 0.4 0.2 0.0
1.47 1.41 1.33
Notes: This table reports the volatility of output for di⁄erent degrees of international di-
versi￿cation (lower sigma implies larger diversi￿cation) and for varying levels of correlation
between home and foreign idiosyncratic shocks. The middle column corresponds to the
behcnmark parametrization.
From Table 3 we con￿rm that larger international diversi￿cation is associated
with lower aggregate volatility. This can happen in one of two ways. One is by
￿rms increasing the relative size of their foreign operations, and the other is by a
lower correlation between ￿rm speci￿c shocks at home and abroad. While we did not
explicitly model the ￿rms￿choice for their foreign operations, it is certainly a margin
under the ￿rms￿control. On the other hand, the correlation of idiosyncratic shocks
is exogenous. These results provide us with testable predictions about the relative
bene￿ts of FDI in di⁄erent locations according to the degree of correlation between
economies, and to the extent of ￿rms￿foreign operations.
6 Conclusion
Over the last three decades economic ties among countries have deepened and branched
out in di⁄erent directions. While some forms of integration can increase a country￿ s
vulnerability to external shocks, others could hedge against internal events. One of
these forms is Foreign Direct Investment. By diversifying geographical risk ￿rms can,
in principle, smooth their pro￿ts, earnings and sales cycles. Whether these bene￿ts
spill to the aggregate economy, foster faster growth, or alter ￿rms￿￿nancing decisions
remain open questions.
On closer look we ￿nd that larger FDI can be a common thread behind the lower
volatility, faster growth, and lower leverage observed in both developed and developing
countries. Based on an extension of Bernanke et al. (1999) ￿Financial Accelerator￿
framework that allows for international diversi￿cation, we ￿nd that in the presence of
credit market frictions international diversi￿cation is associated with the three trends.
The model suggests that in spite of international diversi￿cation being a mitigating
force on the external ￿nancing premia, larger overall ￿rm operations could result in
larger borrowing costs, which steer ￿rms away from debt towards internal ￿nancing.
Larger internal ￿nancing increases the economy￿ s rate of capital accumulation and
therefore of growth. Higher net worth (collateral) in addition to the diversifying
23bene￿ts of FDI dampens the credit market friction leading to smoother credit cycles,
and thus smoother investment and production.
Quantitatively, for a country like the U.S., larger FDI investment could decrease
output volatility up to 20 percent, raise ￿rms￿net worth relative to assets by close
to 8 percentage points, and signi￿cantly reduce the time it takes for an economy to
reach its steady state capital stock.
24A Mathematical Derivations
In this appendix we provide the derivation of some expressions used in the paper.
A.1 Firm￿ s Return on Capital
This subsection shows that RkQKj is equivalent to Yj + (1 ￿ ￿)QKj ￿ WLj. This
result follows from constant returns to scale in the production function and the ￿rm￿ s
equilibrium conditions.
Let Lt;j denote ￿rm￿ s j household and entrepreneurial labor. Constant returns to
scale imply:
Yt;j = (MPKt;j)Kt;j + (MPLt;j)Lt;j in equilibrium.
Yt;j = [QtR
k
t ￿ Qt(1 ￿ ￿)]Kt;j + WtLt;j
Yt;j = R
k
tQtKt;j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)QtKt;j + WtLt;j
R
k
tQtKt;j = Yt;j + (1 ￿ ￿)QtKt;j ￿ WtLt;j:
That is, ￿rm speci￿c shocks to the ￿rms￿asset return is equivalent to a ￿rm speci￿c
shock on the value of the ￿rm: output plus undepreciated capital minus labor costs.
A.2 Multinational￿ s Expected Return on Capital
Next we show the derivation of equation 2. Figure 3, summarizes the performance of
an internationally diversi￿ed ￿rm depending on the realizations of home and foreign
￿rm level shocks. Realizations to the right of the frontier lead to the accumulation
of net worth; realizations inside the frontier lead to the ￿rm￿ s liquidation. Then, the
































































































































































































































































The last line plus the non-default ￿nancing costs are represented in equation 2.
B Data Sources
Foreign Direct Investment data for Figures 1 and 2 was taken from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Foreign Direct Investment On-
line Statistical Database. We transformed the nominal FDI series into real terms
using the base year 2000 Implicit Price De￿ ator series from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Real GDP series at purchasing power parity are drawn from the Penn
World Table Version 6.1, published by the Center for International Comparisons at
the University of Pennsylvania.
26For the model calibration we used the following series from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
1. U.S. Quarterly Real GDP.
National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.7.6.
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/index.asp.
2. U.S. Quarterly Real Gross Private Domestic Investment.
National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.6.
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/index.asp.
3. U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad.
http://www.bea.gov/bea/di/home/iip.htm.
4. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment.
http://www.bea.gov/bea/di/home/directinv.htm.
5. U.S. Current-Cost Net Stock of Fixed Assets.
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/home/￿xedassets.htm.
6. Balance Sheet and Operational Indicators of U.S. Multinationals.
http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/iidguide.htm#USDIA.
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